The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy, an ad hoc and voluntary group of experts on Israeli law and specifically Israeli public law, expresses its grave concern over the apparent intention to abolish the independence of the judiciary, to subordinate it to the government and to the partisan political considerations of the executive branch, to undermine the independent status of the attorney general and civil service legal counsels, and to violate human rights. In this position paper we examine the case law of the Israeli Supreme Court relating to security and the occupied territories.

We find that:

● The Israeli Supreme Court rarely intervenes and practices extreme restraint as concerns government measures in security matters or in matters relating to Israel’s policy in the occupied territories.

● Presenting the Supreme Court’s involvement as ‘restrictive’ in a manner which impedes the government’s ability to act is mistaken and misleading.

● Empirical studies over recent decades indicate that despite using human rights rhetoric, the Supreme Court rarely strikes down policy concerning the conduct of hostilities or  counterterrorism measures.

● Insofar as concerns active fighting and use of lethal force, the Supreme Court has not restrained the government in a significant manner.

● The Supreme Court has refused to decide on the legality of the settlement policy, effectively  paving the way to the expansion of the settlement policy by Israeli governments. .

● For decades the Supreme Court has been interpreting the international norms applicable to the occupied territories in a manner which grants the government broad powers, often in contravention of the accepted understanding of these norms in the international community.

The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy, an ad-hoc and voluntary group of experts on Israeli law, and specifically Israeli public law, expresses its grave concern over the apparent intention to abolish the independence of the judiciary, to subordinate it to the government and to the partisan political considerations of the executive branch, to undermine the independent status of the attorney generals and legal advisors, and to violate human rights.

In this position paper, we examine the attack on the Department of Internal Police Investigations. We see grave danger in the proposed bill to amend the Police Ordinance (“Department of Internal Police Investigations (DIPI) Law”).[1]  This proposal is another tier in the abolition of the rule of law and in politicization of the legal system as a whole, and raises concern that this is only the first instance of political intervention in criminal law enforcement in Israel.[2]

As detailed herein, each component of the bill separately does not achieve the bill’s stated purpose as set out in the explanatory notes, but rather will lead to the opposite result. Namely, rather than allowing unbiased investigations and prosecutions, the bill positively ensures bias in DIPI’s operations and undue influence on the prosecution authorities. Taken together, the components of the bill present a clear and unambiguous picture: passing this bill will cause significant erosion in the independence of the prosecution, enable politicians to intervene in the enforcement of criminal law, politicize the management and operation of the DIPI, and impair the fight against corruption. Furthermore, the bill does not advance any of the objectives worthy of correction concerning the DIPI’s operation, such as, first and foremost, ensuring equality before the law.

The bill cannot beviewed separately from the general legislativelandscape, and the legislation dealingwith law enforcement in particular. The previous amendment to the Police Ordinance involved the "Ben-Gvir Law",[3] and the two amendments together constitute apparent steps toward the politicization of the entire law enforcement system. The essenceof the said amendment (the Ben-Gvir Law) involves subordinating the police to the Minister of National Security, and provides extraordinary, explicit and detailed provisions concerning the minister’s authority to set police policy, without ensuring the police any countering independent professional discretion. This is compounded by the fundamental changes planned in the process of the appointment of judges and legal advisors, which will also lead to similar results. Thus, examining all the legislation together, clarifies the overarching goal: the politicization of the criminal law enforcement system, which jeopardizes the system’s chief values, most notably equality before the law.

[1]A bill to amend the Police Ordinance (Department of Internal Investigations) 2022 passed a preliminary reading on February 22, 2023.

[2] This is not an exhaustive review, but rather an initial response to the bill only. Of note, however, is the global trend of transferring the handling of complaints against the police to independent entities, rather than to political actors. See Guy Lurie, “An Accountability Deficit in the System for Dealing with Complaints against the Police in Israel,” 4 Law, Society and Culture 451 (2021) [Hebrew]; see also Itay Fidelman, “Actors for the Investigation of Police Officers – A Comparative Review”, Knesset Research and Information Center Report (2015) [Hebrew], which relates, for example, to the situation in New Zealand, where the authority’s independence is entrenched in legislation to ensure accountability to Parliament (and not to a government body), and whose law prohibits political involvement in the authority’s activities.

[3]Amendment to the Police Ordinance (No. 37), 2022.

As a part of their campaign, supporters of the regime change compare the legal systems of the United Kingdom and Israel, in a way that is mistaken and misleading. The following position paper, written and signed by some of the leading experts on UK public law, provides accurate information on the British legal system. 

Among the signatories of the position paper are former President of the UK Supreme Court (2012- 2017) Lord David Neuberger, former Minister of State for Justice (2013-2016) Lord Edward Faulks KC, senior barrister and member of the House of Lords Constitution Committee (2008- 2021) Lord David Pannick KC, and two professors from UCL, a leading university in Britain. 

The writers of the attached position paper clearly contradict the claims made by supporters of the regime change, and demonstrate the role of the House of Lords as an active second legislative body that initiates legislation and routinely supervises the actions of Parliament. Furthermore, recent proposals for reform in the UK have left unscathed the role of the House of Lords as a primary constitutional protector. 

The position paper examines and rejects the claim that since the United Kingdom’s courts affirm the legal doctrine of legislative supremacy of the Parliament, the judiciary cannot affect the design and execution of public policy. The Human Rights Act 1998 provides courts with two powers in this regard—to interpret legislation in a way that protects human rights, including by departing from the legislature’s intended meaning (section 3), and by issuing a declaration of incompatibility (section 4), which under the legal culture of the UK it is ultimately followed by parliamentary/governmental action that removes the incompatibility. The power to declare incompatibility is often mistakenly considered the only power the UK judiciary possesses; however, while this power has been employed by courts about 30 times, courts have read down statutes that violate human rights in nearly 60 cases. 

Beyond the Human Rights Act, the UK courts have exercised their historical role under the common law to provide a potent restraint on executive power. For example, the Supreme Court intervened in the processes of the UK’s departure from the European Union. Even following Brexit, the writers of the position paper stress, the UK parliament and nearly all its governments affirmed the crucial importance of observing its international legal commitments, including by remaining a state party to the European Convention on Human Rights and continuing to abide by the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights. Membership of this system of human rights imposes further noteworthy constraints on legislative processes.

This paper examines whether indeed, as claimed by supporters of the pending regime changes, New Zealand law does not provide for judicial review on legislation. We conclude that this claim is mistaken and misleading for the following reasons:

1.     Courts in New Zealand have the authority to strike down legislation that infringes upon the right to vote and the right to be elected, unless that legislation is enacted by a super-majority, namely the votes of three quarters of parliament members, or has been approved in a national referendum where a majority vote is required both generally and of the Maori minority specifically.

2.     New Zealand case law provides that courts have the authority to strike down legislation that severely undermines the independence of the judiciary or infringes upon fundamental human rights. These judicial decisions have a restraining effect on legislators.

3.     Additionally, courts are authorized to declare that legislation is incompatible with human rights law. When they do, the New Zealand parliament tends to amend the law.

The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy, an ad hoc, apolitical, and voluntary group of experts on Israeli law and specifically Israeli public law, expresses its grave concern over the apparent intention to abolish the independence of the judiciary, to subordinate it to the government and to the partisan political considerations of the executive branch, and to undermine the independent status of the attorney general legal advisers to the government and to governmental ministries. Following Position Paper No. 9 on the Knesset’s authority to amend basic laws, this Position Paper examines the restrictions on approving amendments to Basic Laws and focuses on the question of when such changes go into effect under law. 

The conclusion of this Position Paper is that the proposals for amending Basic Law:The Judiciary constitute an abuse of power, in light of the clear conflict of interest for the majority coalition. Therefore, even without addressing the question of whether the proposed changes harm the core values of the State of Israel—and in our opinion they do—at a minimum, the proposed changes should only go into effect beginning with the next Knesset.

The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy, an unincorporated and voluntary group of experts on Israeli law and, specifically, on Israeli public law, is gravely concerned about looming initiatives to undermine the independence of Israel’s judicial branch of government, to subordinate it to the partisan and party-driven political considerations of the government, and to curtail the independence of civil-servant ministerial legal counsels to the government and its ministries.

This position paper focuses on the following question: does the majority in the Knesset have unlimited power? We reject the assertion that the Knesset can simply call any legislative act as a “basic law”, and thereby assume the authority to legislate absolutely any content it deems fit. We argue that Israeli law sets limits on the Knesset’s powers, and that if the Knesset were to overstep those boundaries—as will be the case if it enacts the proposed changes—that legislation would be null and void.

The policy paper holds that the Knesset’s legislative powers are restricted in two main aspects: the first is empirical, namely that broad agreement, both within the legislature and in the public, is a prerequisite for amendments that remove existing restrictions on governmental powers. The second is a substantive restriction, according to which amendments to basic laws must be consistent with the basic tenets of democracy.

We contend that even if the proposed changes to Israel’s basic laws may enjoy the support of the contingent majority in the current Knesset, they undermine the basic principles of democracy and are not widely accepted by the public. Therefore, we conclude that the Knesset lacks the power to enact them.

A detailed position paper in Hebrew is available on our website.

The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy, an ad hoc and voluntary group of experts on Israeli law and specifically Israeli public law, expresses its grave concern over the apparent intention to abolish the independence of the judiciary, to subordinate it to the government and to the partisan political considerations of the executive branch, to undermine the independent status of the attorney generals and legal advisors, and to violate human rights. In this position paper, and in view of such intention and its implications, we relate to the anticipated violation of women's rights, as reflected in the government composition and appointments, the coalition agreements, bills proposed by coalition members, and in the actions and declarations of the government and government officials. The conclusion of this position paper is that the totality of actions, commitments, and legislative changes on the part of the government and the coalition severely violate the rights of all women in Israel and reverse the situation of women’s rights in Israel in the gravest manner since the establishment of the State.

In this position paper we analyze the changes proposed by the 37th government in light of the positions of the Venice Commission.

The European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as the Venice Commission, was established in 1990 in order to advise the Council of Europe on issues concerning the rule of law and strengthening democracy.  The Commission’s role is to provide information and advice to members of the Council of Europe in legal matters and to assist them in bringing their legal and institutional structures into line with European standards and international experience in the fields of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  In 2002 the Commission’s statute was amended so as to allow states that are not members of the Council of Europe to become members.  Israel joined the Commission in 2008.

Examination of the Commission’s reports and shows that these steps are flagrantly incompatible with the best practices identified by the Commission in at least three respects: the system of appointing judges, the procedure for constitutional reform, and respect for the rule of law.  If these proposals are adopted Israel will stand alongside countries like Poland, Hungary and Turkey in relation to which the Commission has published negative reports in recent years.

This brief review shows that the measures being furthered by the Government of Israel in order to change the constitutional regime of the country, amount to a clear violation of the fundamental values that lie at the heart of the legal principles identified by the Venice Commission.  The measures are a manifest breach of the minimal standards that the Venice Commission set out regarding appointment of judges, the proper process for constitutional reform, and the principles of rule of law in modern democratic countries.

It must be stressed that the Venice Commission holds that constitutional changes must be seen in their entirety and in the particular political context. When seen in this light the government’s proposals are particularly problematic.

Adoption of the proposals will make Israel a member of a dubious “club” of member states, whose constitutional and legal structure departs from that accepted in modern democracies.

The Forum welcomes the President's call last night to halt the attempt at legislating fundamental changes to Israel’s regime by a bare coalition majority, and his recognition that such a fundamental change may only be achieved by a broad consensus. Unfortunately the President’s call to halt the legislative proceedings has so far gone unheeded, as this morning the Knesset Constitution and Law Committee approved draft legislation aimed at implementing the regime changes for a first reading in the Knesset.

We welcome the President's acknowledgment that when taken together the components of the proposed reform raise concern that the democratic foundations of Israel will be harmed, and his emphasis that the independence and professionalism of the judiciary must be maintained. The President's statement that a necessary condition for any change is the legislation of a Basic Law: Legislation is also commendable. We are mindful that the President's proposal did not go into details, and he only presented general principles. Nevertheless, we consider it essential to point out that in several critical respects his proposal is lacking.

First, the President’s proposal does not address the minimal necessary conditions required in a democratic regime to protect individual human rights. We believe that alongside a Basic Law: Legislation that will establish the procedure for enacting basic laws, it is essential to enact a basic law that guarantees the human rights of all.

Second, according to the President's proposal, basic laws will be immune from judicial review if enacted according to a specific procedure, to be determined by consensus. The problem is that in the absence of a basic law that guarantees the protection of human rights, it would be possible to enact a basic law that violates human rights. As this basic law would not be subject to judicial review it is unacceptable that all basic laws should be immune from judicial review.

Third, the President proposes to establish in the Basic Law: Legislation a mechanism for overriding a court's ruling that invalidates a law "through a majority and process to be established via dialogue and agreement." Over and beyond the principled difficulty with an override clause, the proposal does not limit the rights that may be overridden. It must be emphasized that there are basic rights that may not be overridden in a democratic regime even by a majority decision; similarly, there are "rules of the game," first and foremost amongst which are free, fair and periodic elections, that cannot be overruled.

Fourth, the President's proposal for the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee does not relieve the concern raised by the coalition's proposals. In particular, the proposal for "equal representation of the three branches" could, in practice, leave the de-facto control over appointments in the hands of the coalition, since some of the Knesset representatives will be members of the coalition who support the government representatives. A fundamental principle for the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee must be that the coalition does not have an absolute majority, or, alternatively, that a special majority will be required for judicial appointments so that the coalition alone will not have control over the appointments.

Fifth, the President proposes that the details of all the changes be approved by a broad consensus but does not outline procedural principles for such consensus in a manner that protects the representation of minorities. It is imperative at this moment in time to provide a balanced, thorough, and practical process so that any change resulting from this process will apply only from the next Knesset.

In conclusion: as a starting point the President’s proposal accepts many of the dangerous assumptions underlying the current coalition proposal. We are of the opinion that these assumptions must be addressed and resolved in any dialogue.

The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy, an unincorporated and voluntary group of experts on Israeli law and, specifically, on Israeli public law, is gravely concerned about looming initiatives to undermine the independence of Israel’s judicial branch of government, to subordinate it to the partisan and party-driven political considerations of the government, and to curtail the independence of civilservant ministerial legal counsels to the government and its ministries. This position paper addresses the proposals by the Minister of Justice and the Chair of the Parliamentary Committee on Legislation, Constitution and Law, to modify the composition of the committee for the appointment, promotion and removal of judges from office. Following a comprehensive review of the proposal we are of the view that: 

● The proposals seek to radically change the process for appointing Israel’s judiciary, granting the Government full control over the appointment, promotion, and removal from office of judges at all levels of the judiciary, including the Supreme Court. The proposals of the Minister and Committee Chair doom Israel’s judicial branch, as it was formed since Israel’s establishment, to oblivion. Courts are required to resolve disputes fairly and without prejudice, to interpret the law professionally and fearlessly, and to apply administrative and constitutional judicial review over government action.  In order to carry out these tasks, judges must be professional and independent. A mechanism granting the government supremacy in the process of judicial appointment, promotion, and removal from office will undermine that independence, subordinate the judiciary to the elected government, and render the separation of powers in Israel an empty shell. 

● Granting the government parliamentary coalition control over the appointment, promotion and removal from office of judges will severely hinder the judiciary’s ability to carry out its duties. Judges operating under the threat of being denied promotion or even of removal from office if they do not comply with the elected government’s interests are not independent judges, and are unlikely to be able to perform their role. Moreover, even if such judges will adjudicate according to the law and strive to rule justly, the public’s trust in the judiciary will be lost. 

● Putting the power to appoint judges in the hands of elected politicians devoid of the professional training and experience required to evaluate the quality of candidates for judicial appointment could result in the election of a lower caliber of judges and in the rejection or failure to promote more worthy candidates.

● The lack of an independent judiciary that enjoys the public’s trust will impair the rule of law, Israel’s economy, personal security, and the protection of human rights. 

● Without an independent judiciary and independent civil-servant legal counsels, all governmental power will be concentrated in the hands of the Government. Under such conditions, the Government might strive to entrench its hold on governmental power, impeding fair political processes that can bring change in the identity of the government. In fact, Governmental entrenchment by the elected majority will become almost definite. Moreover, there will be no significant obstacle in the way of governmental policy intentionally benefiting only those subsections of society represented by the Government, while trampling over the rights of other sectors of society (enabling the ‘tyranny of the majority’). Under such conditions, Israel could no longer be regarded a democracy, which will likely result in wide-ranging deterioration of the economy and society.

 ● From the explanatory notes to the draft memorandum of the proposed Basic Law: The Judiciary (Amendment - Reform of Law) issued a few weeks ago by the Minister of Justice, it arises that the purpose of the proposed changes in the composition of the committee for the appointment of judges is to better incorporate the values of the general public in the process, given that the courts adjudicate matters of a public-political character. This consideration is particularly relevant in cases where the Supreme Court rules on value-laden matters of public concern. However, the Minister and Committee Chair’s proposals are not limited to those cases where the Supreme Court rules over constitutional matters in its capacity as Israel’s High Court of Justice. Rather, they extend to the appointment, promotion, and removal from office of judges in all instances. Moreover, contrary to its stated goal, the proposed procedure neither enhances the diversity in the appointment of the judiciary, nor does it improve the measure in which the courts’ makeup reflects Israeli society. Instead, it undermines the basic purpose of constitutions in democratic societies, which is to prevent the abuse of power by a contingent majority acting contrary to society’s fundamental principles. Had the Minister and Committee Chair genuinely wished to improve the measure in which the diversity of Israel society and its different deeply held values are reflected in constitutional judicial decisions, they would have proposed incorporating representatives of the various groups that comprise Israeli society in the judicial appointments committee, and to establish a decision-making mechanism based on  broad agreement. Instead, their proposal focuses exclusively on empowering and entrenching Government power vis a vis the judiciary. 

● The proposal draws inspiration from the involvement of elected officials in judicial appointments, promotions, and removal from office practiced in other countries. However, the political involvement in these systems is limited to appointment of judges to courts that deal exclusively with constitutional issues, and are separate from the remainder of the more professionalized judiciary. Israel’s judiciary contains no such separation: The Supreme Court operates as a court of appeals in civil, criminal and administrative matters and, in a minority of cases, as a constitutional court. And courts of lower instances are certainly not focused on contested public issues as a central issue. Thus, the comparison with models for appointment of judges in other countries is misleading and, in most cases, irrelevant. Moreover, applying the rationale for the design of constitutional courts in other countries to the entirety of Israel’s judiciary will not only fail to rectify or improve it, it will destroy it. 

● Debating the procedure for judicial appointments in isolation from considering the full gamut of changes proposed by the Government obscures the overall significance of the various proposed changes, as in this case the whole is worse than the sum of its parts. The proposals of the Minister and the Committee Chair regarding the appointment of judges are accompanied by proposals to significantly limit the Supreme Court’s authority for constitutional judicial review, an abolition of the condition of government reasonableness as grounds for judicial review, and to enact an override clause allowing a parliamentary majority to override any instance of judicial review. These proposals fortify, entrench and enhance the power of the Government at the expense of other branches of government without mechanisms for checking, limiting and restraining the elected government. This is not a proposal for the reform and consolidation of Israel’s democracy, but a measure for its expunction.

Israel’s new Government is currently advancing a host of far-reaching constitutional and legal changes. The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy analysis of these proposals leads it to conclude that their adoption will irrevocably harm the Israeli democratic system.

The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy, an ad-hoc and voluntary group of experts on Israeli law, and specifically Israeli public law, expresses its grave concern due to the unprecedented attack on the rule of law and democracy in Israel, following the intention of Israel’s 37th Government to rewrite the scope of judicial review in Israel.

●      The Coalition’s proposed amendments to Basic Law: The Judiciary involve a radical transformation of the relations between the branches of government, eliminating all effective judicial checks on the legislative power of the governing majority.

●      The proposed amendments pave the way to uninhibited governmental action in disregard of human rights and the public interest, and they jeopardize the most fundamental democratic principles and processes.

●      Statements that these proposals recognize, for the first time, the courts’ authority to perform constitutional judicial review are false. In fact, the proposals eliminate constitutional judicial review and provide the governing parliamentary majority, which is controlled by the executive branch, a host of means to prevent judicial review, to disregard it, or to override it.

●      The proposals grant the legislature unlimited power to enact Basic Laws—in a simple majority and by normal legislative procedure—and declare these Basic Laws immune to judicial review.

●      The proposals entail transforming judicial review on ordinary legislation into an extraordinary and impracticable procedure that requires the agreement of a vast majority of Supreme Court justices.

●      According to the proposals, judicial review can be overridden by a normal coalition majority of the Knesset.

●      The combination of these components, compounded by the other parts of the constitutional and legal changes proposed by the government (most notably reforming the appointment of judges and justices, diminishing the role of the Attorney General and government legal advisors as gatekeepers, and diluting judicial review in cases of patently unreasonable exercise of government power) remove any legal restrictions on governmental action. Such an uncontrolled government contradicts the fundamental democratic principle of checks and balances, and will irrevocably harm the Israeli democratic system. These proposals exceed the authority of the Knesset which cannot abolish democracy by amending its Basic Laws.

A detailed position paper in Hebrew is available on our website.

The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy, an ad-hoc and voluntary group of experts on Israeli law, and specifically Israeli public law, expresses its grave concern due to the unprecedented attack on the rule of law and democracy in Israel, following the intention of Israel’s 37th Government to enact significant and drastic changes to Israel’s constitutional law without proper procedures.

●      The proposed changes for “reform” of the Israeli judicial system cannot be seen as an incremental stage in the enactment of Israel’s Basic Laws or in their augmentation. Rather, they constitute a substantial and fundamental change to Israel’s constitutional structure, profoundly altering the relations among the judicial branch on the one hand, and the legislative and executive branch on the other. The proposed “reforms” entrench a new set of constitutional “rules of the game”, that are, in practice, largely irreversible, and, as such, should be addressed substantively as the actual formulation of a constitution.

●      Substance aside, the process through which the coalition is passing the legislative amendments constituting the “reform” is not the proper process by which a constitution is created. The process is set to be hurriedly pushed through in the span of a few weeks, led by the coalition without any negotiation or attempt to reach consensus with the opposition, and pays no more than lip service to consultation with the public and experts, despite the strong public protests voiced against the "reform". This represents the exact opposite of how constitutions are to be written. The establishment or profound change of a constitution requires broad consensus, and a procedure different and distinct from ordinary political procedures. Granting agreements the status of constitutional norms (in the case of Israel, in the form of Basic Laws) elevates them to supreme status. It is, therefore, imperative that the processes through which those agreements are reached ensure full participation of the various ethnic, religious and socio-economic sectors of society in the decision-making process, and enable careful consideration of the changes' implications.

●      The proposals presently on the agenda aim to cement fundamental rules of the Israeli regime, yet the process by which they are legislated does not even meet the benchmarks for the proper enactment of ordinary legislation, as members of the opposition and of the public are interrupted and expelled from the parliamentary committee discussions of the proposals without being able to fully present their views. The process through which the government is pushing through its proposed “reform” is, therefore, illegitimate and will significantly impair the legitimacy of the reform, once adopted.

●      We base this normative position regarding the requirement of participatory and careful procedures for instituting fundamental constitutional changes on several grounds: the basic tenets of constitutional and democratic theory; the principles of legislative theory; long-rooted legislative traditions of the Israeli Parliament; and finally, judicial precedent and the basic principles of the Israeli legal system, deriving from its fundamental values as both a democratic and Jewish state.

A detailed position paper in Hebrew is available on our website.

The Israeli Law Professors’ Forum for Democracy, an ad-hoc and voluntary group of experts on Israeli law, and specifically Israeli public law, expresses its grave concern due to the unprecedented attack on the rule of law and democracy in Israel, following the intention of Israel’s 37th Government to undermine the independence of the judiciary and to significantly diminish the role of the Attorney General and government legal advisors as gatekeepers.

Specifically, the Forum warns against the proposed amendment to ‘Basic Law: The Government’, presented by the Chair of the Knesset’s “Constitution, Law, and Justice” Committee.

The proposed legislation revokes the status of the Attorney General and government legal advisors as the authorized interpreters of the law for public authorities, makes the status of their legal opinions non-binding, and allows state officials broad access to private legal advice and representation before courts at will. These changes will enable the government and its ministers to exercisetheir powers in violation of the law, and may foster governmental corruption and endanger social andeconomic stability.

The gatekeeping role of professional and independent legal advisors has traditionally enabled Israeli courts to minimize their interference in governmental decision-making, and has provided international credibility to the actions of the State of Israel. The proposed legislation will eradicate both important advantages. It will enable the government to act in complete disregard of a determination by government legal advisors that a governmental action is illegal, placing the government above the law.

The Forum’s opinion, expressed in our full position paper, constitutes our urgent reaction to an agenda presented by the “Constitution, Law, and Justice” Committee Chair, an agenda which according to Israel’s Legal advisor to the Knesset, was misleadingly presented as an official bill, although it was drafted without the involvement of the Committee’s legal advisory team, in stark contrast to accepted legislative practice. Although we strongly protest the flawed procedure through which the proposal is being advanced, we present in the paper our position addressing its content. We further stress that this specific proposal is but one component of a host of far-reaching constitutional and legal changes which we understand as an intentional attack on Israel’s democratic character and on the independence of Israel’s Supreme Court, aimed at concentrating unlimited power in the hands of the majority. We vehemently oppose these processes, and our position paper should be understood accordingly.

A detailed position paper in Hebrew is available on our website.

We, senior faculty members at law schools in Israel, strongly oppose the regime change that the Israeli government is promoting under the guise of “legal reforms”. These far-reaching constitutional changes include providing the government with absolute control over the appointment of the judiciary; near complete elimination of judicial review; dissolution of civil-servant ministerial legal counsels as gatekeepers; and undermining the freedom of the press. In aggregation, these proposals suffocate the independence of the judiciary, dissolve the separation of powers between the branches of governments, and eliminate the rule of law. No recognized democratic country in the world operates under such conditions. The combination of the proposed changes is alarming and dangerous. It will bring far-reaching infringements of human rights, and strip Israel’s system of government of fundamental features of its structure as a democracy.

We call on those involved in the legislative process to avoid hasty constitutional legislation that would transform the character of the State of Israel, and we urge them to initiate a process of open, respectful, and tolerant deliberation with the aim of reaching broad agreements on these deeply consequential matters.